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APPLYING THE DIGITAL SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
DOCTRINE TO PREDIGITAL CONTENT 
EUGENE R. MILHIZER* 
“Before you become too entranced with gorgeous gadgets and 
mesmerizing video displays, let me remind you that information is not 
knowledge, knowledge is not wisdom, and wisdom is not foresight. Each grows 
out of the other, and we need them all.”1 
“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
Stable law has many benefits. Stability can indicate that the law is morally 
grounded and socially useful. The law ought to be stable insofar as it reflects 
and implements transcendent and immutable values. Stable law can bind 
generations to enduring norms.3 Stability can also lead to widespread 
knowledge and understanding of the law, which in turn affords people the 
capacity to conform their conduct to its precepts.4 Moreover, stability suggests 
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2008–2014. The author would like to thank his friend, John Willette, for his advice and counsel 
regarding technology. The author would also like to thank his research assistant, Andrea Phillips, 
for her outstanding work in the preparation of this article. 
 1. CHARLES E. LATHROP, THE LITERARY SPY: THE ULTIMATE SOURCE FOR QUOTATIONS 
ON ESPIONAGE & INTELLIGENCE 10 (2014) (quoting Sir Arthur C. Clarke). 
 2. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance (1841), reprinted in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
QUOTATIONS § 5, at 307 (Elizabeth Knowles 6th ed., Oxford University Press 2004). 
 3. Of course, stability of the law is no guarantee that the law is moral. Slavery, for example, 
was legal in many American states for generations. Its ultimate abolition is in large part 
attributable to the immorality of the institution. See 1 OHIO ANTI-SLAVERY SOC’Y, NARRATIVE 
OF THE LATE RIOTOUS PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS, IN CINCINNATI 3 
(Cincinnati 1836); 1 R. GUY M’CLELLAN, REPUBLICANISM IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE 
COLONIAL AND REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM THE 
YEAR 1607 TO THE YEAR 1869 72 (R.J. Trumbull & Co. 1869); 2 CARL SCHURZ, HENRY CLAY: 
AMERICAN STATESMEN 70 (John T. Morse, Jr., ed., Boston, Mass. Houghton Mifflin 1897); 1 
FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, A SHORT CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY THE UNITED STATES 190 
(Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1904). 
 4. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1986) (“[T]he important doctrine of stare 
decisis, the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will 
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that the law is practical and perhaps wise. If it were otherwise, one might 
presume that the law would be revoked or modified, especially in a 
representative democracy. Sometimes, however, stable law is simply stagnant 
law, whose constancy can be attributed to nothing grander than inertia5 or a 
lack of consensus for change.6 
The law must also be dynamic. It does not exist in a vacuum but rather 
reacts and adapts to the changing social, economic and cultural circumstances. 
Technology is perhaps the most sweeping and pervasive agent of change. It is 
rapid, constant, and amoral. It can magnify good or evil. It can be 
unfathomably lethal or life-saving and medicinal. It relentlessly advances like 
an accelerating drumbeat, which leaves no aspect of human life untouched.7 It 
can displace persons, occupations, and whole societies. Technological 
development is always destabilizing. 
The tension between the stability of the law and the destabilizing impact of 
technology has been repeatedly played out in American courtrooms, 
particularly with regard to the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.8 The results have been inconsistent and varied. For example, 
when listening devices became more sophisticated, the Court abandoned the 
trespass theory for searches in favor of an interest-based rationale.9 Thermal 
 
develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. That doctrine permits society to presume that 
bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and 
thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in 
appearance and in fact.”). 
 5. Law of Motion, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
law%20of%20motion [http://perma.cc/3ZFJ-XLYM] (“a statement in dynamics: a body at rest 
remains at rest and a body in motion remains in uniform motion in a straight line unless acted 
upon by an external force—called also Newton’s first law of motion”). 
 6. For example, most people think the current taxing policies should be fundamentally 
changed. See Rodney P. Mock & Nancy E. Shurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 
443, 443 (2014) (“[T]he current informal partnership between the software companies and the 
IRS should be critically assessed to address advances in software technology and increasing 
taxpayer reliance on commercial tax preparation software.”). The failure to implement changes is 
largely the result of lack of consensus in support of any particular change. See Holly Doremus, 
Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 1, 21–22 (2003) (“In the real world, 
policy inertia is likely to dominate policy impulsiveness, and adaptive plasticity is likely to prove 
elusive. Experience suggests that it is extraordinarily difficult to change the law. Law and policy 
choices often seem to hang on long after their original purpose has evaporated.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Bradley H. Leiber, Applying Ethics Rules to Rapidly Changing Technology: 
The D.C. Bar’s Approach to Metadata, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 893 (2008). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 9. Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (applying a physical 
trespass rationale to determine whether the government’s activity constitutes a search), with Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (applying an expectation of privacy rationale to 
determine whether the government’s activity constitutes a search); United States v. Jones, 132 S. 
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imaging devices caused the Court to further refine its approach for searches 
and introduced the term “not in general public use” to the Fourth Amendment 
lexicon.10 Electronically transmitted conversations,11 pen registers,12 and 
overflights13 were each considered and addressed. More recently, the Court 
took up the use of global positioning system (GPS) devices and beepers to 
track a suspect’s movements.14 On the horizon is the use of drones,15 cell 
tower pinging,16 metadata gathering,17 through-the-wall technologies,18 and 
other capabilities currently under development or not yet imagined.19 
 
Ct. 945, 952 (2012) (discussing how the “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added 
to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”) (emphasis added). 
 10. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Where, as here, the Government uses a 
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have 
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant.”); see State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1175 (N.M. 2015) (Chavez, 
J., specially concurring) (introducing the alternate phrasing “commercially available 
technology”). 
 11. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (“If the conduct and revelations of an 
agent operating without electronic equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally 
justifiable expectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the same 
conversations.”). 
 12. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736, 739–46 (1979) (“The installation and use of a pen 
register, consequently, was not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required.”). 
 13. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447–52 (1989) (allowing police to inspect a greenhouse 
from a helicopter without a warrant); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (“The 
Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the public airways at this 
altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.”). 
 14. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–52 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS 
device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, 
constitutes a ‘search.’”). 
 15. See United States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025-EFS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184672, at 
*29 n.8 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014); Y. Douglas Yang, Big Brother’s Grown Wings: The 
Domestic Proliferation of Drone Surveillance and the Law’s Response, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
343, 344 (2014). 
 16. See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 776–81 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Wilford, 961 F. Supp. 2d 740, 772–73 (D. Md. 2013); Eric Lode, Validity of Use of Cellular 
Telephone or Tower to Track Prospective, Real Time, or Historical Position of Possessor of 
Phone Under Fourth Amendment, 92 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2015). 
 17. See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 564–70 (D. Md. 2014); Orin S. 
Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 532–33 (2005). 
 18. See United States v. Thompson, 811 F.3d 944, 949–50 (7th Cir. 2016); Marc Jonathan 
Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to 
a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1410–11 (2004). 
 19. Suppose police obtained a new technology that allowed for the searching of a suspect’s 
thoughts in the same manner as they can now remotely measure heat emanating from a distant 
source. The information thus gathered would be helpful, and in some cases even indispensable, 
for the prevention and investigation of crimes. The use of such a device would also have obvious 
Fourth Amendment implications. For example, would its use constitute a search? If so, would a 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
168 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:165 
In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court addressed one of the most 
influential and ubiquitous technological devices of the early 21st century, the 
cell phone.20 In Riley, the Court modified the long-standing search incident to 
lawful arrest (hereinafter “SILA”) exception to the warrant requirement by 
providing heightened protection to the digital contents of a cell phone. This 
article explores whether Riley’s reasoning should lead to the same, enhanced 
protection for certain kinds of predigital information.21 Part I of this article 
explains the development and rationale for the Court’s SILA exception. Part II 
reviews the Riley decision and its reasoning. Part III considers whether the 
enhanced protection Riley affords to digital information stored in a cell phone 
should likewise be accorded to some types of predigital information 
encountered during a SILA. It concludes that some predigital information is 
deserving of the same enhanced protection that Riley grants to a cell phone’s 
digital contents. 
I.  HISTORY OF THE SILA EXCEPTION 
The Fourth Amendment is composed of two clauses: the reasonableness 
clause22 and the warrant clause.23 Whether the Framers intended the two 
clauses to operate independently (i.e., the reasonableness of a search can be 
 
warrant be required? Would the use of such a device be deemed to be so intrusive as to be 
unreasonable regardless of the showing that the government might make in a particular case? 
What if this technology becomes commercially available? These and other issues would 
ultimately need to be addressed by the courts. 
 20. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (“Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the 
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in 
digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array 
of private information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is.”). According to 
the International Telecommunication Union’s report in 2015, “[t]he proportion of the global 
population covered by mobile-cellular networks is now over 95 per cent,” and “the number of 
mobile-cellular subscriptions has quintupled” since 2005. INTERNATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, MEASURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY REPORT 2015, at 2 
(2015). “[T]he number of mobile-cellular subscriptions approaches 7.3 billion and mobile 
population coverage reaches close to 95 per cent globally.” Id. at 100. 
 21. “Predigital” information, as used in this article, refers to information that could be 
created and stored by methods that predate the creation of “digital” information. Justice Alito 
used the term “predigital” in his separate opinion in Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2496 (Alito, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). The terms “digital” and “predigital” are discussed 
in more detail, infra notes 136–38 and accompanying text. 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”). 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”). 
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evaluated without reference to a warrant)24 or inter-dependently (i.e., for a 
search to be reasonable it must be based on a valid warrant)25 has been the 
subject of a protracted debate,26 with various Supreme Court justices over time 
acting as proponents for the opposing approaches.27 
In the early years, the Court consistently held that a search had to be 
conducted “pursuant to a warrant or . . . fall within one of the exceptions to the 
warrant requirement.”28 This reasoning was forcefully reaffirmed by Katz v. 
United States29 and its progeny, in which the Court shifted from a trespass 
theory to a privacy-interest approach for determining whether a government 
activity constituted a search.30 Although recent Supreme Court cases may 
 
 24. TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 46–47 (1969) 
(If you “have viewed the [F]ourth [A]mendment primarily as a requirement that searches be 
covered by warrants, [you] have stood the amendment on its head.”); Akhil Redd Amar, The Bill 
of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1179 (1991) (“Searches without warrants are not 
presumptively illegitimate.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. 
L. REV. 757, 766–67 (1994) (“And this straightforward result is yet another signal that many of 
the most important searches and seizures can and must take place without warrants.”). 
 25. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106–07 (1965) (“The fact that exceptions to 
the requirement that searches and seizures be undertaken only after obtaining a warrant are 
limited underscores the preference accorded police action taken under a warrant as against 
searches and seizures without one.”); Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: 
Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 514 (1991) (“The [F]ourth 
[A]mendment’s warrant requirement is the only meaningful protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. The warrant requirement cannot be dispensed with; it must be 
revitalized.”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 358 (1974) (“Under this theory, the Court has uniformly condemned searches and 
seizures made without a search warrant . . . .”). 
 26. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 553 (1999). 
 27. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (observing that the Court’s Fourth Amendment “jurisprudence [has] lurched back and 
forth between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.”). 
 28. William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the “Per Se” Rule: Justice 
Stewart’s Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1013, 1041 (1994) (“A long line of cases from 1789–1958 recognized that for a search to be valid 
under the Fourth Amendment, that search must either be pursuant to a valid warrant or fall within 
one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.”). 
 29. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”). 
 30. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (following “[t]he Katz test—whether the 
individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable”); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“Katz posits a two-part inquiry: first, has the 
individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? 
Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?”); Mancusi v. DeForte, 
392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (“[T]he protection of the Amendment depends not upon a property right 
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portend a shift toward the primacy of the Reasonableness Clause,31 the current 
status of the Court’s decisional law can be fairly characterized as follows: for a 
search to be reasonable there is a presumptive requirement that it be conducted 
pursuant to a valid warrant,32 which can be avoided only if the government’s 
activity falls within the parameters of an explicitly delineated exception to the 
warrant requirement.33 Put another way, the need for a warrant has become the 
“default position” when a warrant exception does not apply.34 
 
in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable 
expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion.”). 
 31. E.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999) (instructing that in 
evaluating the reasonableness of a search, the Court should look first to whether a particular 
action was regarded as unlawful under the common law and, second, whether it satisfies 
traditional standards of reasonableness); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444, 447, 455 (1990) (allowing a warrantless, suspicionless sobriety checkpoint on a 
highway based upon the special need of ending drunk driving); New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 
325, 337, 340 (1985) (allowing the warrantless search of a student because “[a]lthough the 
underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be 
reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place.”); the 
Court famously upheld the Terry stop-and-frisk based upon reasonableness: 
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons 
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of 
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable 
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his 
reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself 
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such 
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a 
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may 
properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
 32. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (“There was no constitutional 
justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area. The 
scope of the search was, therefore, ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
and the petitioner’s conviction cannot stand.”). Proponents of a presumptive warrant requirement 
commonly recite the following benefits of having police obtain a search warrant: (1) the judgment 
of a neutral and detached judicial officer regarding probable cause to search is often more 
accurate than the judgment of the police, who are motivated to investigate crime and catch 
criminals; (2) the risk of an unfounded intrusion upon privacy is reduced when a judicial officer 
makes the probable cause determination; and (3) even if the judicial officer rubber stamps the 
police request to search, a warrant ensures the police will not search without prior justification. 
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 14, 17 (1948). 
 33. Admittedly, this characterization of the Court’s approach is a bit simplistic. See, e.g., 
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451–52, 455 (allowing a sobriety checkpoint, without individualized suspicion, 
in order to combat “the magnitude of the drunken driving problem” under a special needs 
exception); Terry, 392 U.S. at 10, 30 (allowing “stop and frisk[s]” when an officer has 
“reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for 
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One of the explicitly delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement 
involves searches incident to a lawful arrest. Under the SILA exception, a 
police officer who makes a lawful, custodial arrest35 may conduct a 
contemporaneous,36 warrantless search of the arrestee’s person and the area 
within the arrestee’s immediate control.37 Search authority under the SILA 
exception extends to containers in the arrestee’s possession and within his 
grabbing distance.38 If the arrest occurs in a residence, the police may also 
conduct a warrantless search of “closets and other spaces immediately 
adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately 
 
the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the true facts and 
neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized.”). 
 34. JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
198 (4th ed. 2006); e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–44 (2009) (restraining the vehicle 
exception to the warrant requirement to circumstances when officer could have “reasonably have 
believed either that [the occupant] could have accessed his car at the time of the search or that 
evidence of the offense for which he was arrested might have been found therein”); New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (vehicle exception to the warrant requirement involving 
marijuana odor; holding that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the 
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile.”); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372, 
376 (1976) (holding that a warrantless, inventory search of a vehicle is constitutional if 
“following standard police procedures”); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248–49 
(1973) (allowing warrantless searches as long as the totality of the circumstances show that the 
consent was not coerced); Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967) 
(allowing a warrantless search “as broad as may reasonably be necessary to prevent the dangers 
that the suspect at large in the house may resist or escape,” an exigency exception). 
 35. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234–35 (1973) (allowing law enforcement to 
thoroughly search—rather than just Terry-like frisk—a custodial arrestee because of the specific 
dangers associated with a custodial arrest, e.g., the length of time an officer would have contact 
with the custodial arrestee during transport); the Court succinctly concluded that “it is the fact of 
custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search.” Id. at 236. 
 36. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968) (observing “[i]t is axiomatic that an 
incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of its justification”). 
 37. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. The area under the arrestee’s immediate control is sometimes 
referred to as the grabbing or lunging area. See, e.g., Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (grabbing); Thornton 
v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 621 (2004) (lunging). It does not include penetration of bodily 
surfaces. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–72 (1966); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 
753, 760–63 (1985). And it likely does not, at least in the ordinary case, include strip searches. 
Cf. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 808 n.9 (1974) (quoting Charles v. United States, 
278 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 831 (1960)) (“We thus have no occasion to 
express a view concerning those circumstances surrounding custodial searches incident to 
incarceration which might ‘violate the dictates of reason either because of their number or their 
manner of perpetration.’”). 
 38. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 226 (allowing search of the arrestee and the surrounding area “‘in 
order to remove any weapons’” or “‘seize any evidence’”) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). 
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launched.”39 The SILA exception does not confer authority to search beyond 
these parameters, such as to remote portions of a residence even if the arrest 
occurs within its walls.40 Neither a search warrant nor probable cause to search 
is needed for the SILA exception. The requisite showing to conduct a 
warrantless SILA is simply that: (1) the arrest is lawful, i.e., based on probable 
cause; (2) the search is contemporaneous with the arrest; and (3) the scope of 
the search is confined to the arrestee and his grabbing distance and, in the case 
of an arrest in a residence, adjoining areas.41 Further, the police may lawfully 
seize without a warrant any items discovered during a SILA, even if the item 
pertains to an unrelated crime,42 provided the officer has probable cause to 
believe the item is contraband or an instrumentality, fruit, or evidence of a 
crime.43 
The rationale for the SILA exception to the warrant requirement rests on 
enhancing police safety and preserving evidence. The Court has recognized 
that a custodial arrest provides the arrestee with an incentive to use a weapon 
to resist the police and escape, and to destroy or conceal evidence.44 Moreover, 
an arrest in a residence creates the risk that an accomplice or friend of the 
arrestee might be close by and come to the arrestee’s aid by attacking the 
police.45 Because such risks are serious and ubiquitous, the Court fashioned a 
 
 39. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (“Beyond that, however, we hold that there 
must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, 
would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an 
individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.”). 
 40. Early Supreme Court decisions authorized broader authority to search under SILA. 
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 59–63 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 
151 (1947). Both these cases were overruled by Chimel. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768. After Chimel, 
police may search beyond the grabbing distance (and adjoining areas, if applicable) only if the 
search is conducted pursuant to a warrant or falls within the scope of another exception to the 
warrant requirement. 
 41. Also required is that an arrest is authorized for the offense. Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347–55 (2001). There is not authority to conduct a warrantless search 
incident to a citation. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116–19 (1998). 
 42. E.g., Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235–36 (holding that the arresting officer properly seized 
heroin discovered during the search of a traffic offender). 
 43. See Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967) (holding there 
must be “a nexus . . . between the item to be seized and criminal behavior”); Arizona v. Hicks, 
480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (holding the police must have probable cause to seize items found in 
plain view). 
 44. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35 (“It is scarcely open to doubt 
that the danger to an officer is far greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the 
taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station than in the case of the 
relatively fleeting contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop.”); Riley v. California, 134 S. 
Ct. 2473, 2483 (2014). 
 45. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333–34 (1990) (Considering “[t]he risk of danger in the 
context of an arrest in the home,” the “arresting officers are permitted in such circumstances to 
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bright-line SILA exception to address them categorically. Under the exception, 
the arresting officer is relieved of the burden of making an ad hoc judgment 
about whether a warrantless SILA is supported by probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion, just as the courts are spared the task of performing a 
case-by-case analysis of whether the officer’s decision to search without a 
warrant was based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion.46 
In the years following Chimel v. California,47 much of the Court’s 
attention with respect to SILA related to the outer boundaries of an arrestee’s 
immediate control,48 and whether the search was contemporaneous with the 
arrest.49 This decisional authority often addressed the application of the SILA 
exception to vehicles and vehicle occupants.50 
Far less developed by the Court was the question of whether there would 
be any restrictions on the police authority to search and seize items under SILA 
because of the particular privacy interests implicated by the item itself. Quite 
to the contrary, the Court expressed the view that a full and intrusive search of 
 
take reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while making, the arrest. That interest is 
sufficient to outweigh the intrusion such procedures may entail.”). 
 46. Further, the SILA exception also recognizes the impracticality of obtaining warrants to 
search incident to arrest given the fluidity and spontaneity of many arrests. 
 47. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 752. 
 48. E.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 365–66, 368 (1964) (finding officers’ 
search of the vehicle of bank robbery suspects under search incident to arrest authority—after the 
vehicle was towed from the scene to a garage—was too remote to be a reasonable search). 
 49. E.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 801–02, 805 (1974) (allowing a suspect’s 
clothes to be admitted into evidence when they were seized after he spent the night in jail). 
 50. In 2009, the Court analyzed SILA with specific regard to the vehicle exception 
jurisprudence: 
Indeed, some courts have upheld searches under Belton “even when . . . the handcuffed 
arrestee has already left the scene.” 
Under this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search would be authorized incident to every 
arrest of a recent occupant notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle’s passenger 
compartment will not be within the arrestee’s reach at the time of the search. To read 
Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent occupant’s arrest would 
thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception—a result 
clearly incompatible with our statement in Belton that it “in no way alters the fundamental 
principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to 
lawful custodial arrests.” Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton and hold that the 
Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s 
arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search. 
Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also conclude that circumstances unique to 
the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is “reasonable to 
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 342–43 (2009) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 628 (2004); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 
(1981); Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
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an arrestee, including containers on the arrestee’s person and within his reach, 
was reasonable if for no other reason than because the search was incident to a 
lawful arrest.51 No additional showing, such as probable cause or an exigency 
to search, was needed.52 Thus, containers on the arrestee’s person and within 
the search zone could be searched and seized pursuant to the SILA exception 
even when there was no apparent threat to the safety of the police or the 
integrity of the evidence. 
In United States v. Robinson, for example, the suspect was arrested for 
suspicion of driving on a revoked license.53 During the ensuing SILA, the 
arresting officer felt an object in the arrestee’s breast pocket that he could not 
identify.54 The officer pulled it out and saw that it was a crumpled cigarette 
packet.55 The officer could feel objects inside the packet that did not seem to 
be cigarettes.56 The officer was confident, however, that the packet did not 
contain a weapon that could threaten his safety.57 Further, the officer did not 
claim that a contemporaneous search of the packet was needed to preserve 
evidence58 as he could have seized and secured the packet, and later sought a 
warrant to search its contents.59 The officer nevertheless immediately opened 
the packet and found inside several gelatin capsules containing heroin.60 The 
officer seized the capsules, which served as the basis for the arrestee’s 
prosecution on drug possession charges.61 
The Supreme Court held in Robinson that the authority to conduct a 
warrantless SILA “does not depend on what a court may later decide was the 
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in 
fact be found upon the person of the suspect.”62 The Court explained that “[a] 
custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion 
under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to 
the arrest requires no additional justification.”63 The Court instructed that this 
 
 51. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 220. 
 54. Id. at 221–23. 
 55. Id. at 223. 
 56. Robinson, 414 U.S at 223. 
 57. Id. at 251, 253, 256 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. at 252. 
 59. Probable cause for an arrest allows an officer to search the arrestee’s person and 
immediately surrounding area—permitting the officer to seize containers found therein—but it 
does not allow a search of seized containers without a subsequent search warrant or pertinent 
exigent circumstance. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1977) (quoting Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). 
 60. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 223. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 235. 
 63. Id. 
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is a bright-line rule, which obviates the need to “litigate[] in each case the issue 
of whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority 
for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest.”64 The Court concluded 
that “in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not 
only an exception to the warrant requirement . . . but is also a “reasonable” 
search under [the Fourth] Amendment.”65 
But what if the container in Robinson had been a purse or a briefcase rather 
than a crumpled cigarette packet? Could the police then search its contents 
without a warrant? What if the officer had removed a diary or sealed envelope 
from the arrestee’s person and opened it to check for weapons? Could the 
officer then read its contents? Should a categorical approach to the SILA 
exception be applied to these items, thereby permitting their private content to 
be thoroughly searched absent a warrant or even probable cause? A recent 
Supreme Court decision addressing digital technology and data may be 
instructive in responding to these types of issues. 
II.  SILA APPLIED TO THE DIGITAL CONTENTS OF CELL PHONES 
In Riley v. California, decided in 2014, the Supreme Court unanimously 
held that the warrantless search of a cell phone seized during an arrest is 
unconstitutional.66 The case arose from a split among federal and state courts 
over whether the Fourth Amendment permitted the warrantless search of the 
digital contents of a cell phone under SILA authority.67 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
 66. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
 67. Circuit courts were split on the issue of whether or not the contents of a cell phone could 
be searched without a warrant after a lawful arrest. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 
(1st Cir. 2013) (“We therefore hold that the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not authorize 
the warrantless search of data on a cell phone seized from an arrestee’s person, because the 
government has not convinced us that such a search is ever necessary to protect arresting officers 
or preserve destructible evidence.”); United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 804–10 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (allowing the search of the cell phone in order to get its phone number, but noting that 
it may be problematic if other personal information were sought); United States v. Arellano, 410 
F. App’x 603, 606–07 (4th Cir. 2011) (allowing the officers to seize the cell phone under SILA, 
but not to power on the cell phone and field incoming calls); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 
250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007) (allowing the SILA exception to validate the cell phone search of the 
custodial arrestee because a cell phone is like a container, which could hold evidence of a crime). 
State supreme courts also had differing opinions as to whether or not a custodial arrest allowed 
the warrantless search of cell phones. See Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 738, 740 (Fla. 
2013) (not allowing warrantless searches of cell phone data without a further exigency or safety 
concern: “In our view, allowing law enforcement to search an arrestee’s cell phone without a 
warrant is akin to providing law enforcement with a key to access the home of the arrestee.”); 
Commonwealth v. Phifer, 979 N.E.2d 210, 215–16 (Mass. 2012) (“[T]he limited search of the 
defendant’s cellular telephone to examine the recent call list was a permissible search incident to 
the defendant’s lawful arrest,” because the search was limited and the officer had probable cause 
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Riley was a consolidated opinion involving two cases.68 In the first case, 
David Riley was pulled over for expired registrations tags.69 During the stop, 
the officer learned that Riley was driving with a suspended driver’s license.70 
Police department policy, at the time, required the vehicle be towed and 
impounded to prevent someone, like Riley, from driving again with a 
suspended license.71 Department policy also required officers to perform an 
inventory search of the vehicle, which led the police to find two loaded 
handguns under its hood.72 Because of the discovery of the concealed weapons 
and gang paraphernalia during the vehicle search, police placed Riley under 
arrest and searched his cell phone’s digital contents without a warrant.73 The 
cell phone search yielded information indicating that Riley was a member of a 
local gang.74 Evidence found in the cell phone included pictures, cell phone 
contacts, text messages, and video clips.75 Among the photos was a picture of 
another vehicle that Riley owned that was involved in an earlier gang 
shooting.76 Based in part on the pictures and videos recovered from the cell 
phone, Riley was charged in connection with the gang shooting and the 
prosecution sought a sentence enhancement based on Riley's gang 
membership.77 Riley moved to suppress the cell phone evidence, but the judge 
 
that the call log would contain evidence of the crime.); Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924, 925–26 
(Ga. 2012) (allowing the warrantless search of cell phones under the closed-container SILA 
exception); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 509–11 (Cal. 2011) (allowing even a delayed search of 
the cell phone’s text messages because the cell phone was on the custodial arrestee’s person at the 
time of arrest); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954–56 (Ohio 2009) (not allowing the search of a 
cell phone without a warrant because cell phones hold highly private information and are 
therefore not equivalent to closed containers). 
 68. People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 
8, 2013), rev’d sub nom. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v. Wurie, 612 
F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d and remanded, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. 
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 69. Riley, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at *5–6; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. 
 70. Riley, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at *6; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. 
 71. Riley, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at *6; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. 
 72. Riley, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at *6–7; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480 (citing 
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12025(a)(1), 12031(a)(1) (West 2009)). Later ballistic testing would 
confirm that the handguns were used in an earlier gang-related murder, for which Riley had been 
a suspect. Eyewitnesses to the shooting claimed Riley could have been one of the shooters, but 
they did not positively identify Riley. None of this information was known to the arresting officer 
at the time of the traffic stop. Riley, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at *2–3. 
 73. Riley, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at *7–8; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81. 
 74. Riley, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at *4, *8; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81. 
 75. Riley, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at *7–8; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81. 
 76. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
 77. Riley, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at *1, *1 n.2; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
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permitted it to be introduced at both the first trial and on retrial.78 Ultimately, 
Riley was found guilty, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed his 
conviction.79 
In the second case, Brima Wurie was arrested after police saw him 
participate in an apparent drug sale.80 At the police station, officers seized two 
cell phones from Wurie’s person, including a “flip phone.”81 Shortly thereafter, 
police observed the “flip phone” receive multiple calls from a source identified 
as “my house” on the phone's external screen.82 The officers opened the phone, 
accessed its call log, determined the number associated with the “my house” 
label, and traced that number to what they believed was Wurie’s apartment.83 
Police obtained a search warrant for Wurie’s residence and, during the ensuing 
search, found crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm, 
ammunition, and cash.84 Wurie was later charged with drug and firearm 
offenses, and he moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of 
the apartment.85 The district court denied the motion and Wurie was 
convicted.86 A divided panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
denial of the motion to suppress and vacated the related convictions.87 The 
court held that cell phones are distinct from other physical possessions that 
may be searched incident to arrest without a warrant because of the vast 
amount of personal data cell phones contain and the negligible threat they pose 
to law enforcement interests.88 
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court on the 
consolidated cases, holding that a warrant is required to search a cell phone 
seized incident to a lawful arrest.89 Roberts wrote that the digital contents of 
cell phones do not fall within the warrantless search authority of the SILA 
exception to the warrant requirement established by Chimel: 
Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm 
an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee's escape. Law enforcement 
officers remain free to examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it 
will not be used as a weapon—say, to determine whether there is a razor blade 
 
 78. Riley, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at *1–2, *5, *8–10, *20; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 
2481. 
 79. Riley, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at *1, *30; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
 80. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 2; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
 81. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 2, 15; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
 82. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 2; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
 83. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 2; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
 84. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 2; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
 85. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 2; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482. 
 86. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 2; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482. 
 87. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 1, 14. 
 88. Id. at 13–14. 
 89. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495. 
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hidden between the phone and its case. Once an officer has secured a phone 
and eliminated any potential physical threats, however, data on the phone can 
endanger no one.90 
Roberts recognized that evidence stored on a cell phone may possibly be 
destroyed by either remote wiping or data encryption, but he explained that this 
is “the ordinary operation of a phone's security features, apart from any active 
attempt by a defendant or his associates to conceal or destroy evidence upon 
arrest.”91 Accordingly, the warrantless search of the phone’s digital contents 
would likely make little difference regarding the preservation of data. 
Cell phone data would be vulnerable to remote wiping from the time an 
individual anticipates arrest to the time any eventual search of the phone is 
completed. . . . Likewise, an officer who seizes a phone in an unlocked state 
might not be able to begin his search in the short time remaining before the 
phone locks and data becomes encrypted.92 
Finally, Roberts argued that cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a 
qualitative sense from other objects that might be found in an arrestee’s pocket. 
Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all 
they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the 
privacies of life.” The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry 
such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of 
the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the question of 
what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest 
is accordingly simple—get a warrant.93 
Justice Alito wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment, citing his dissent in Arizona v. Gant94 that questioned Chimel’s 
categorical approach to the SILA exception.95 Alito nonetheless agreed with 
the majority: 
[W]e should not mechanically apply the rule used in the predigital era to the 
search of a cell phone. Many cell phones now in use are capable of storing and 
accessing a quantity of information, some highly personal, that no person 
would ever have had on his person in hard-copy form.96 
 
 90. Id. at 2485. 
 91. Id. at 2486 (emphasis in original). 
 92. Id. at 2487. Roberts cites several common methods for either turning off or preventing 
the phone’s security features. Roberts then cites several common examples to either turn off or 
prevent the phone’s security features. Id. 
 93. Id. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
 94. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495–96 (Alito, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment) 
(citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 361–363 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting)). 
 95. Gant, 556 U.S. at 361–63 (Alito, J., dissenting) (questioning Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969)). 
 96. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment). 
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Alito expressed concern, however, that the majority opinion creates certain 
anomalies. He observed that “[u]nder established law, the police may seize and 
examine [hard copies of information] in the wallet without obtaining a warrant, 
but under the Court's holding today, the information stored in the cell phone is 
out.”97 Alito suggested that Congress and state legislatures may need to 
consider new laws that draw “reasonable distinctions based on categories of 
information or perhaps other variables.”98 In the absence of proactive 
legislation, Alito cautioned that “it would be very unfortunate if privacy 
protection in the 21st century were left primarily to the federal courts using the 
blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment.”99 
Few would disagree with Alito’s admonition that the elected branches of 
government should enact laws in response to emerging technologies that 
safeguard privacy interests beyond the Fourth Amendment’s basic 
parameters.100 There are many examples of effective legislation that provide 
enhanced privacy consistent with fundamental values and public sentiment.101 
Regardless of the presence or absence of such statutes, however, the Fourth 
Amendment affords an irreducible core of privacy protection that must be 
judicially recognized and applied, especially in circumstances when the elected 
 
 97. Id. at 2497. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Laws are subordinate to the Constitution. Thus, legislation can provide greater protection 
for privacy than required by the Fourth Amendment but it may not lessen or diminish its 
protection. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1567 (2013) (quoting Virginia v. Moore, 
553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008)) (alteration in original) (“States [may] choos[e] to protect privacy 
beyond the level that the Fourth Amendment requires.”); Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 
133 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2012) (“Where a specific statute, for example, conflicts with a general 
constitutional provision, the latter governs. And the same is true where a specific state statute 
conflicts with a general federal statute.”); State v. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d 492, 499 (Iowa 2007) 
(“States are not only permitted to enact statutes that are consistent with constitutional principles, 
they may also define greater rights than provided by the federal and state constitution.”); State v. 
Lynch, 74 P.3d 73, 79 (N.M. 2003) (“As a general proposition, statutes may provide greater, but 
not less, protection to individual rights than the constitution.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2012) (protecting 
electronic communications unless heightened circumstances allow disclosure, such as the 
information “relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities”); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
2511 (2012) (protecting against recording oral communications, unless falling under limited 
exceptions); Bank Secrecy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (1994) (requiring banks to make copies of 
checks and deposits but not allowing the information to be automatically seized by the 
government); Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-11(a) (1982) (protecting information 
that “would intrude upon a known confidential relationship such as that which may exist between 
clergyman and parishioner; lawyer and client; or doctor and patient” because of “a recognition of 
special concern for [those] privacy interests”); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 
U.S.C. § 1232g (1982) (protecting dissemination of education records). 
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branches of government are slow or unwilling to act. It is in this spirit that 
Riley’s potential application to predigital privacy will next be considered. 
III.  EXTENDING RILEY DIGITAL PROTECTION TO SOME TYPES OF PREDIGITAL 
INFORMATION 
Riley modified the prior categorical rule that all items taken from an 
arrestee’s person may be fully searched absent a warrant and probable cause 
pursuant to the SILA exception.102 It holds that the SILA authority does not 
extend to the digital contents of a cell phone seized during a SILA.103 Instead, 
police may seize the item based on probable cause and apply for a warrant to 
search it.104 The fundamental question presented by Riley with regard to its 
possible broader application to predigital information is this: is the digital 
information stored on cell phones afforded the enhanced protection of a 
warrant during a SILA because of peculiar privacy considerations related to the 
quantity and quality of the information contained in such devices, or instead is 
the data typically stored in a cell phone part of a larger class of information 
that is entitled to the enhanced protection of a warrant during a SILA? Put 
simply, are the digital contents of a cell phone uniquely deserving of the 
protection of a warrant when the phone’s contents could otherwise be searched 
without a warrant during a SILA? 
To answer this question, it is initially useful to consider the Court’s 
rationale for the SILA exception as it was originally applied to predigital 
information. The SILA exception and its bright-line application are predicated 
on a balancing of competing interests. On the one hand, the government has a 
powerful and undeniable interest in protecting the safety of police officers 
while making arrests and preserving evidence that is obtained from 
arrestees.105 Besides being weighty—and the interest in police safety is 
especially weighty106—these law enforcement interests are almost always 
 
 102. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. 
 103. Id. at 2485. 
 104. If the arrestee was to be confined immediately following his arrest, then the cell phone 
could be impounded (seized) and inventoried. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644, 647 
(1983) (“A so-called inventory search is not an independent legal concept but rather an incidental 
administrative step following arrest and preceding incarceration. . . . The reasonableness of any 
particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of 
alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.”). Whether the digital contents of the cell phone could be 
obtained pursuant to an inventory search based on prospective confinement is beyond the scope 
of this article. 
 105. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483. 
 106. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 331 (2009) (“The government’s ‘legitimate and 
weighty’ interest in officer safety, the Court said, outweighs the ‘de minimis’ additional 
intrusion.”) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1977)); Maryland v. Buie, 
494 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (“[A]lthough a frisk for weapons ‘constitutes a severe, though brief, 
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implicated anytime someone is arrested.107 Further, the arrest and 
circumstances surrounding it are often unforeseeable, and thus not subject to 
prior judicial review.108 On the other hand, the countervailing privacy interests 
implicated during a SILA are comparatively weak. A search incident to an 
arrest generally involves only marginal additional intrusiveness beyond that 
already experienced by the arrestee by virtue of his arrest.109 Given the 
strength and virtual certainty of the government’s interest to search, as 
contrasted to the minimal intrusiveness of the search experienced by the 
 
intrusion upon cherished personal security,’ such a frisk is reasonable when weighed against the 
‘need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of 
violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest.’”) (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968) (citation omitted)). A stop and frisk is allowed when “a 
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or 
that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. “There is no reason why an officer, rightfully 
but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one question 
and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.” Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 107. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (“When an arrest is made it is 
reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons 
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.”). 
 108. Id. at 778–79 (White, J., dissenting). 
 109. In Chimel, Justice White’s dissenting opinion paves the way for the concept of SILA’s 
slight privacy interest infringement when the suspect is already under arrest: 
[I]f circumstances can justify the warrantless arrest, it would be strange to say that the 
Fourth Amendment bars the warrantless search, regardless of the circumstances, since the 
invasion and disruption of a man’s life and privacy which stem from his arrest are 
ordinarily far greater than the relatively minor intrusions attending a search of his 
premises. 
Id. at 776. 
Less than four years later, the Court in Robinson explained: 
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the 
Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no 
additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to 
search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person 
is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also 
a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment. 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 
800, 801–02, 805 (1974) (upholding the reasonable search and seizure of clothing literally taken 
off a custodial arrestee’s back the morning after his arrest, ten hours post-arrest, because it was a 
“normal incident of a custodial arrest, and reasonable delay,” and the custodial arrestee “was no 
more imposed upon than he could have been at the time and place of the arrest or immediately 
upon arrival at the place of detention”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 386–88, 392, 398 
(1914) (holding, after the arrest of a man at his place of work, the warrantless search and seizure 
of the arrestee’s lottery papers—found in his bedroom after a neighbor showed police where to 
find the key to the home—unreasonable, because the police needed a warrant to enter the sanctity 
of the home and the papers were not found within arrestee’s control at the time of the arrest). 
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arrestee, the Court fashioned a categorical bright-line exception to the warrant 
requirement for SILA.110 
In Riley, the competing values implicated by searching the digital contents 
of cell phones caused the Court to recalibrate its earlier SILA balancing. The 
Court observed that police safety is not jeopardized by the digital contents of a 
cell phone, and it is unlikely that the contemporaneous searching of a cell 
phone’s digital contents will assist in the preservation of evidence.111 In any 
event, a cell phone can always be seized during a SILA and a warrant can be 
sought to search its digital contents.112 Balanced against these negligible 
government interests in support of a contemporaneous search of a cell phone’s 
digital contents is the especially weighty intrusion upon individual privacy 
interests caused by such an action. The digital information contained in a cell 
phone is often both intimate and wide-ranging. The intrusion upon privacy 
interests resulting from such a search would likely exceed the relative 
intrusiveness upon the arrestee’s liberty interests by virtue of his arrest. 
Because the government’s interest in conducting a contemporaneous search is 
weak and the individual privacy interests implicated are far more compelling, 
the SILA exception is not allowed for the digital contents of cell phones.113 
Note that Riley did not replace the bright-line SILA rule with a case-by-
case exception for cell phones. Rather, it established a categorical, bright-line 
exemption for these devices.114 Accordingly, no cell phone can have its digital 
contents derivatively searched based on a lawful arrest.115 A warrant is 
presumptively required.116 For a warrantless search to be reasonable in 
connection with an arrest, it must fall within the parameters of another 
exception to the warrant requirement, such as an exigency exception, based on 
the particular circumstances of the case.117 
 
 110. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493, 2495. 
 111. Id. at 2485–87. 
 112. It does not necessarily follow that a search warrant will inevitably be granted to search a 
cell phone’s digital contents. A warrant would be denied in those cases in which the government 
lacks probable cause to search, a result that is consistent with broader Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Further, regardless of whether the government has authority to search a cell phone 
under a warrant or SILA, it may lack the capacity to access encrypted content. See Lev Grossman, 
Inside Apple CEO Tim Cook’s Fight With the FBI, TIME (Mar. 17, 2016), http://time.com/42624 
80/tim-cook-apple-fbi-2/ [http://perma.cc/2P4B-E5tv]. 
 113. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492, 2495. 
 114. Id. at 2493, 2495. 
 115. Id. at 2493. 
 116. Id. 
 117. “To the extent that a search of cell phone data might warn officers of an impending 
danger, e.g., that the arrestee’s confederates are headed to the scene, such a concern is better 
addressed through consideration of case-specific exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as 
exigent circumstances.” Id. at 2478. “The exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn,’ Jones v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958), and there must be ‘a showing by those who seek 
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The specific facts of Robinson, albeit superficially, support drawing a 
sharp distinction between the digital contents of a cell phone and the predigital 
contents of other containers. The container in Robinson was a crumpled 
cigarette package.118 It has none of the obvious attributes of a container 
containing highly personal or private information, such as a cell phone. The 
cigarette package could be accurately described as a container that is unworthy 
of the protection of a warrant in SILA situations.119 This is an easy case. 
But what about other types of predigital containers? Surely a handwritten 
diary will predictably contain highly personal and private information, perhaps 
information that is even more personal and private than much of the 
information that could routinely be obtained from a cell phone.120 In such 
 
exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative,’ McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) 
(alteration in original) (citations added). For example, in Warden, the police were looking for an 
armed robber who, through an informant tip, was thought to be in the home searched. Warden, 
Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297–98 (1967). The Court not only found that 
the exigent circumstances allowed the warrantless entry of the home and search for the suspect, 
but allowed the search for weapons and accomplices even after the suspect was caught. 
The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an 
investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. Speed 
here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons 
could have insured that Hayden was the only man present and that the police had control 
of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape. 
Warden, 387 U.S. at 298–99. However, the Court did not allow a per se exigency exception to 
apply to blood tests in DUI cases even though alcohol dissipates in the blood. Missouri v. 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1560–61 (2013). 
 118. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973). 
 119. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 429–32 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining 
that “officers needed a warrant to open a sealed, opaquely wrapped container in the rear 
compartment of a station wagon,” containing two bricks of marijuana, because there is a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in a package thus wrapped), overruled by United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). The Robbins majority disagreed with Powell, observing that “[w]hat 
one person may put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper bag.” Robbins, 453 U.S. at 426, 
overruled by Ross, 456 U.S. 798. 
 120. Ironically, there may be a diminished expectation of privacy with regard to some digital 
information. For example, digital information that is published on social media would have a 
diminished expectation of privacy. United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525–26 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967); United States v. 
Barone, 913 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1990)) (holding that law enforcement officers, building a case 
against a gang member, could use information obtained through a cooperating witness’ social 
media profile access—a Facebook friend’s access); In re Application of the United States, 830 F. 
Supp. 2d 114, 139 (E.D. Va. 2011) (emphasis added) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 
295, 303–06 (1999)) (holding that “[p]etitioners knew or should have known that their IP address 
information was subject to examination by Twitter, so they had a lessened expectation of privacy 
in that information, particularly in light of their apparent consent to the Twitter Terms of Service 
and Privacy Policy.”). Similarly, information that has been communicated via e-mail or a text 
would seemingly have a diminished expectation of privacy. State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 55–56 
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circumstances, upon what principled basis could the Court require the 
protection of a warrant for a digital diary accessed via a cell phone but not 
require a warrant for a handwritten diary accessed by opening a book and 
reading it? Four possible arguments might be reasonably raised in support of 
such a distinction. For the reasons set forth below, none of these contentions 
are ultimately persuasive. 
First, one might argue that cell phones presumptively contain private 
information while predigital items do not. While this assertion may generally 
be correct, it would not be accurate in all circumstances. It would certainly not 
be true, for example, in the case of purses, wallets, briefcases, and backpacks. 
It would not be true for paper books that are clearly recognizable as diaries and 
notebooks. It would not be true for containers marked as medical or financial 
records. It would not be true for scrapbooks, photo albums, and sealed 
correspondence. In all such circumstances, it seems doubtful that a fact-based 
distinction predicated on degrees of privacy could be reasonably drawn 
between digital information in cell phone containers and these types of 
predigital information in traditional containers. Given all of the situations in 
which this presumption would be in contradiction with the actual facts, it 
would seem unjustified to predicate a bright-line rule on its presumed 
accuracy. 
A second possible argument in favor of categorically distinguishing 
between digital and predigital information is that such line drawing is 
supported by the rationale underlying the SILA exception. This argument 
likewise fails. The basis for the SILA exception is police safety and 
preservation of evidence. There is no reason for believing the contents of a 
handwritten diary or a sealed envelope, for example, would pose any greater 
threat to these law enforcement interests than would the digital contents of a 
cellphone. Of course, a diary or envelope—indeed, any container including a 
cell phone in a carrying case—could conceivably conceal a weapon or 
evidence that might be destroyed. Riley responds to these concerns by allowing 
a limited warrantless search of cell phones to address these risks.121 Similar 
allowances could easily be permitted for the physical contents of books, 
envelopes, briefcases, purses, wallets and so forth. Put simply, the risk-
 
(R.I. 2014) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 154 (1978); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. 109, 117 (1984)) (“In determining whether a person has an expectation of privacy in his text 
messages, the most important factor . . . is from whose phone the messages are accessed” because 
it indicates less control of the information and the corresponding assumption of risk when 
speaking with another person). 
 121. The Court allows SILA limited searches of the physical contents of a cell phone, and still 
allows the exigency exception to allow a search of the phone’s digital contents. Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (“Such exigencies could include the need to prevent the 
imminent destruction of evidence in individual cases, to pursue a fleeing suspect, and to assist 
persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] APPLYING THE DIGITAL SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST DOCTRINE 185 
avoidance rationale for the SILA exception does not support treating facially 
private predigital information in cell phones any differently than facially 
private digital information in traditional containers. 
A third argument for distinguishing between the digital contents of a cell 
phone and predigital information in traditional containers relates to the sheer 
quantity of the information that can be stored on the former. A quantitative 
approach for assessing privacy, however, is inconsistent with the Court’s 
predigital case authority. For decades, the Court repeatedly held that the need 
for a warrant is to be determined by the quality of the privacy interest intruded 
upon and not the quantity of the information to be searched. For example, in 
Smith v. Maryland, the Court held that the warrantless use of a pen register to 
obtain certain information (the phone numbers dialed by the suspect) was 
reasonable because the information gathered was not private.122 A warrant was 
not needed regardless of the amount of such data collected because of the 
public nature of the data.123 On the other hand, if the pen register had obtained 
a single bit of information regarding the contents of a telephone conversation, 
this would have constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment because of the private nature of this information.124 Smith teaches 
that it is the quality and not the quantity of the information obtained via the pen 
register that determines whether the government’s warrantless use of this 
device constitutes an unreasonable search. 
The same distinction between the quality and quantity of information has 
been recognized even when the information to be searched is far more 
extensive and diverse. For instance, police may conduct a warrantless search of 
the entire contents of a mobile home residence, in large part because of the 
diminished expectation of privacy afforded to vehicles in general.125 In 
contrast, police would presumptively need a warrant to search a non-mobile 
residence or a personal computer kept inside of it.126 A search warrant would 
be required for a fixed residence even if the police knew the precise location of 
 
 122. 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (“[P]etitioner in all probability entertained no actual 
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation 
was not ‘legitimate.’ The installation and use of a pen register, consequently, was not a ‘search,’ 
and no warrant was required.”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 741 (“Yet a pen register differs significantly from the listening device employed in 
Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications.”). 
 125. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (“In short, the pervasive schemes of 
regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies 
attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate 
so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.”). 
 126. It has long been held that entering a home without a warrant is per se unreasonable. See 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). “That the house of every one is to him as his 
castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose . . . “ Id. at 
596 n.44 (quoting Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603)). 
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the information in the residence or stored in the computer inside of it and thus 
could avoid any collateral privacy intrusions during their search. Under the 
Court’s traditional decisional authority, the Fourth Amendment presumptively 
requires a warrant for in-home searches because it protects against 
unreasonable intrusions upon privacy regardless of how wide-ranging or 
cabined the intrusion may be.127 In contrast, the Fourth Amendment is 
generally not concerned with activities that do not intrude upon cognizable 
privacy interests regardless of the volume of information these activities may 
gather.128 It follows from these principles that the requirement for a search 
warrant based on a cell phone’s capacity to store a vast quantity of data, even if 
defensible on the merits in such cases, is irrelevant when evaluating whether a 
warrant is needed to protect the privacy interests implicated by a single bit of 
information residing in a traditional container having a much smaller storage 
capacity. 
Recently, the Court considered whether the quantity of information 
obtained by a GPS or beeper device was a factor in determining whether a 
search warrant was required for its use in United States v. Jones.129 Jones, 
taken together with Riley, may portend that a quantitative analysis—in addition 
to a qualitative analysis—is sometimes necessary in evaluating privacy 
interests, given the capacity of new technologies to gather and store 
voluminous information. But the conclusion that a search warrant should be 
required in some circumstances because of the vast quantity or diversity of 
information that can be obtained by or stored in a digital device does not mean 
that clearly private information should be accorded less protection because it is 
gathered or stored in a narrow or discreet manner. 
A fourth argument in support of drawing a distinction between digital and 
predigital information is that doing so preserves the benefits of a simple and 
clear bright-line SILA rule. The premise of this argument is correct, insofar as 
categorical rules are undeniably easier for police to apply in the field and for 
courts to review at trial and on appeal. While simplicity and ease of application 
are desirable, these benefits should not be decisive in assessing the wisdom of 
a bright-line rule. Rather, a rule’s other benefits and burdens should be 
 
 127. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1987) (holding that moving a few stereo 
components to read serial numbers on the bottom of them based on a reasonable suspicion they 
were stolen constituted an unreasonable search of these items as this exceeded the scope of a 
legitimate exigency-based search of an entire residence for a shooter, victim, and weapons). 
 128. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
 129. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor 
concurred, adding further analysis into the increased privacy interest that occurs with “longer 
term GPS monitoring in investigations.” Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). The longer the GPS 
monitoring, the greater “the sum of one’s public movements” the government could retain. Id. at 
956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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evaluated before reaching a comprehensive judgment about its wisdom.130 The 
Court’s Chimel-Riley approach to the SILA warrant exception should be 
subjected to the same scrutiny. 
The most important benefit of a categorical SILA rule (with a categorical 
cell phone exception) is that it relieves the arresting officer from making a 
case-by-case determination of whether it is reasonable to search containers on 
the arrestee’s person or within his reach. Preempting this decision from the 
officer during an arrest protects police from the possibly dire consequences of 
misjudging circumstances and incorrectly deciding that a search was not 
warranted. This reasoning, however, posits a false choice for the arresting 
officer: between either conducting a thorough, contemporaneous search or 
foregoing a search all together. There is a third option that is readily available 
and easily implemented, i.e., the arresting officer may seize an item having 
facial indicia of enhanced privacy without a warrant, perform a cursory search 
of it—if reasonable to ensure it is not dangerous—and then later seek a warrant 
to authorize a more extensive search of it based on probable cause. This third 
approach would fully serve all of the objectives of the SILA exception while 
simultaneously providing the enhanced protection of a warrant to predictably 
private information. While such a revised SILA rule would be somewhat more 
nuanced and less categorical than a bright-line Chimel-Riley distinction, any 
concerns about the complexity of its application could be mitigated by limiting 
judicial review of the arresting officer’s decision to a simple objective 
reasonableness standard.131 The concept of “objective reasonableness” is both 
 
 130. Every bright-line rule necessarily has some lack of conformity (the delta) between the 
results obtained via the application of the rule versus the results obtained through a case-by-case 
approach. This delta is a cost or burden of a bright-line rule that should be assessed when 
evaluating the rule’s wisdom. Where the delta is wide or the interests compromised via 
application of a bright-line rule are weighty, the rule seems unwarranted. See Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9–11, 21–22 (1985) (invalidating a Tennessee bright-line rule that allowed 
deadly force without probable cause to believe the criminal suspect was dangerous and had 
recently committed a felony, since life is an especially weighty factor). A bright-line rule can 
more readily be justified where the delta is small and the interests harmed are comparatively 
minor. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 351–54 (2001) (“If an officer has 
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in 
his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender” provided the 
officer has the statutory authority to make a custodial arrest). 
 131. The Court notes that the objective reasonableness standard lessens “second-guessing” by 
the hindsight of judicial review: 
Often enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of 
the moment, and the object in implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw 
standards sufficiently clear and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving 
judicial second-guessing months and years after an arrest or search is made. Courts 
attempting to strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the government’s 
side with an essential interest in readily administrable rules. 
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familiar to police officers and consistent with broader Fourth Amendment 
requirements, and thus it should present few difficulties in its application or 
review.132 
The guideposts for the reasonableness standard could be simple and easily 
applied. Officers may always search arrestees for weapons and to preserve 
evidence. Accordingly, physical evidence on the arrestee’s person and within 
his grabbing distance can be thoroughly inspected for these limited purposes. 
A more intrusive search of items having indicia of enhanced privacy 
interests—such as by reading text, listening to recordings, accessing video, 
etc.—is generally not permitted without a warrant.133 The arresting officer, in 
any case, may seize such items and apply for a warrant to search their private 
contents.134 Under this approach, the same protection accorded to cell phones 
 
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996) (following the 
Court precedent that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement does not hinge upon an 
officer’s subjective intent but upon “objectively justifiable behavior,” aside from the limited 
“context of inventory search or administrative inspection”) (citing United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584, n.3 (1983)) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 218 
(1973)); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (“[T]he court should ask whether the agents 
acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances, not whether another reasonable, or more 
reasonable, interpretation of the events can be constructed five years after the fact.”). 
 132. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984) (“[T]he good-faith exception [to the 
warrant requirement], turning as it does on objective reasonableness, should not be difficult to 
apply in practice. When officers have acted pursuant to a warrant, the prosecution should 
ordinarily be able to establish objective good faith without a substantial expenditure of judicial 
time.”) (emphasis added); Whren, 517 U.S. at 812 (The Court “flatly dismissed the idea that an 
ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of their legal justification,” because the subjective 
intent of the officer does not negate the legally objective justification for the officer’s actions.); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (“And in making that assessment it is imperative that the 
facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the 
moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the 
action taken was appropriate?”). 
 133. This idea of limiting a SILA of some items having indicia of privacy to a cursory 
inspection to protect police is similar to the function of a protective sweep, which permits a 
cursory inspection of a residence to determine if others are present who may present a danger to 
police. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). Buie upheld the admittance of a running suit 
found during a protective sweep of the basement—even though the suspect was already arrested 
and the basement was beyond the immediately adjoining area of the arrest—because the officers 
could provide “specific and articulable facts” that a dangerous individual was in the basement. Id. 
at 327–28, 332 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). Of course, a more intrusive search would be 
reasonable without a warrant if it is prompted by a concern for police safety or the destruction of 
evidence. 
 134. This is analogous to an officer’s authority to seize a container based on probable cause 
but to need a warrant to search its contents. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) 
(quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 367 (1964)) (“Once law enforcement officers have 
reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the 
arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain 
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because of the presumptively private nature of their contents would be 
accorded to predigital information presenting presumptively similar privacy 
expectations. 
More broadly and apart from the above-discussed considerations, the Court 
must be careful to avoid drawing an artificial dichotomy between digital and 
predigital information for SILA purposes. “Digital data” can be defined as 
“[i]nformation represented and processed in the form of combinations of digits 
(0 and 1, in the binary system).”135 Computers and cell phones, among other 
devices, store and access digital information. Predigital information includes 
“analog data,” which is defined as “[d]ata represented in a quantitatively 
analogous way.”136 “Examples are the deflection of a movable-coil meter, the 
positioning of a slider on a slide rule, and the setting of a variable resistor to 
represent the value of a nonelectrical quantity.”137 Analog information can be 
accessed and stored, for example, on traditional telephone answering 
machines, record players and magnetic tape recorders. Predigital information 
also encompasses what might be termed pre-analog information such as 
handwriting, printings, drawings and film photography. Pre-analog information 
extends back in time for centuries. Notable and venerable examples of pre-
analog information include the Dead Sea Scrolls, hieroglyphics and cave 
paintings.138 
While the technological differences between digital information and some 
types of predigital information is obvious, some distinctions are not so clear. 
For example, would a magnetic tape recording be considered digital or 
predigital information for SILA purposes? What if the recording was stored on 
a floppy disk? What about information stored in a photocopier or a telephone 
answering machine? Applying a digital/predigital distinction, would the actual 
writing made by a smartpen be subject to a warrantless SILA while a search of 
 
access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer 
an incident of the arrest,” thus requiring a warrant to search the personal property). 
 135. THE ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS 189 (Stan Gibilisco ed., 8th ed. 2001). 
“[D]igital,” in general, means “[p]ertaining to components, circuits, or systems that use signals 
having an integral number of discrete levels or values, rather than signals, whose levels or values 
vary over a continuous range.” Id. at 188. See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON’S TELECOM 
DICTIONARY 375 (Steve Schoen ed., 26th ed. 2011). 
 136. THE ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS, supra note 135, at 27. 
 137. Id. “[A]nalog,” in general, means “[a] quantity that corresponds, point for point or value 
for value, to an otherwise unrelated quantity. Thus, voltage is the analog of water pressure, and 
current is the analog of water flow.” Id. See NEWTON, supra note 135, at 125–26. 
 138. Also known as parietal art, cave paintings date back some 40,000 years. K. Kris Hirst, 
Cave Art—What Archaeologists Have Learned: Parietal Art of the Ancient World, ABOUT.COM, 
http://archaeology.about.com/od/cterms/g/caveart.htm [http://perma.cc/EZ8C-JDG5]. 
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the data stored in the pen requires a warrant?139 If so, does this distinction 
make sense? 
Consider the range of issues raised in the following two situations if a strict 
digital/predigital distinction for the SILA exception is recognized and applied. 
In the first case, police arrest a suspect within arm’s reach of a file cabinet. 
They perform a cursory search of the cabinet’s interior and determine there are 
no weapons inside. While conducting the weapons search, police see paper 
files, analog tape recordings and a digital flash drive inside the cabinet. Which 
of these items, if any, should be subject to an intrusive warrantless SILA? Is 
there any principled basis for distinguishing between these items for SILA 
purposes? Suppose the file cabinet has a digital locking mechanism. Does this 
matter? What if the cabinet, instead, had a mechanical lock and key 
mechanism? Would the result be different?140 
In the second case, assume a fax machine is within the grabbing distance 
of an arrestee when he is lawfully arrested. Is a warrant needed to perform a 
SILA of the information contained in the machine’s memory? May printed 
pages stacked in the machine’s tray be searched without a warrant? May the 
pages awaiting transmission on top of the machine be searched without a 
warrant? If the machine is in the midst of printing a transmission when the 
arrest is made, may the police read what is already printed as part of a SILA? 
May police instead wait for the printing to be completed and then read the 
entire document pursuant to the SILA exception? May police wait for pending 
transmissions to be received and printed, and then read those transmissions 
pursuant to SILA authority? 
 
 139. “A smartpen is a computer in a pen that captures everything a person hears and writes 
and synchronizes the written notes with the audio. Smartpen users can simply tap on their 
handwritten notes with their smartpen to hear the conversation play back from that exact moment 
in time.” AT Quick Guide: Taking Notes with the LiveScribe Smartpen, HIGH INCIDENCE 
ACCESSIBLE TECH. (May 9, 2011), http://www.montgomeryschoolsmd.org/departments/hiat/tech 
_quick_guides/LiveScribe_taking_notes.pdf [http://perma.cc/J7U4-EBHU]. 
 140. One could of course argue that regardless of the type of locking mechanism present, if 
the cabinet was locked its contents would not be readily accessible to the arrestee and thus not 
subject to being searched under the SILA exception. But what if the cabinet was unlocked? 
Would it then matter if the locking mechanism is digital or predigital? Consider that Riley does 
not suggest that the reasonableness of searching a cell phone’s digital contents turns on whether 
the contents are password protected, i.e., whether a digital lock has been engaged. Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2487 (2014) (“Similarly, the opportunities for officers to search a 
password-protected phone before data becomes encrypted are quite limited.”). Even if the digital 
lock, e.g., password protection, was not engaged, the digital contents could not be searched 
pursuant to the SILA exception. On the other hand, the contents of a filing cabinet with an 
unlocked mechanical locking mechanism would be subject to a warrantless SILA under Chimel 
and its progeny if the interior of the cabinet was within the arrestee’s grabbing distance. See 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
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As these hypothetical situations demonstrate, in many cases any supposed 
practical or interest-based differences between digital and predigital 
information for Fourth Amendment purposes is illusory and meaningless. 
Applying differing Fourth Amendment standards on a digital versus predigital 
distinction alone would literally elevate format over substance and may have 
no correlation to the actual privacy interests at stake. It would be unprincipled 
and unwise to decide mechanically whether to afford the enhanced privacy 
protections recognized by Riley, depending on whether the information in 
question could be better characterized as digital or predigital. 
CONCLUSION 
Riley is not the first time that the Court has had to reevaluate its decisional 
law in light of technological advancements. It certainly will not be the last. The 
Court’s engagement of emerging technologies offers it an opportunity to 
reconsider and correct past decisions addressing traditional situations. In doing 
so, the Court would be wise to focus on underlying Fourth Amendment values 
rather than on technical gadgetry. Private content is private, whether it is 
handwritten in a diary, entered and stored digitally on a cell phone, or created 
and retained by some modality that has yet to be invented. Technology 
advances. The Court must respond. In doing so, it should be guided by 
enduring constitutional principles rather than the particular attributes of a 
transient device, however remarkable and pervasive it may be. 
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